Introduction
The position taken in this paper is that when we make and take health care decisions they are based on multiple perceptions made by intimately related persons based on a shared reality that has been constructed by those persons.
In this way of understanding 'problems', when presented as illness or disease, are located within what we might call an 'ecology of ideas'. There is no one reality from which we can determine our understandings, only varying ways offitting behaving and thinking together. This perspective moves away from the notion of an individual reality, '1', and towards the notion of community and shared reality, 'You and I together'.
Meaning and implication: the semantics and politics of illness behaviour When we talk about illness, whether it is recognizing that we are 'ill' or making the decision to 'go home' from our work place, which is a step in managing the illness, then we are making statements about our own beliefs and experiences in the world. The punctuation of an episode from the ceaseless stream of life's events has both semantic and political implications. Semantic in the sense that explanations invoke meanings from a given episode. Political in the sense that human behaviour is managed, obligations are suspended and actions are taken.
Both the semantic and the political are linked. Fay Fransella'' writes, ' As a society we construct the social world according to our interests and beliefs, as individuals we construct our beliefs to make sense of our own particular experience of the world. So shared experiences and beliefs support each other -at least for a good deal of the time'
When we offer descriptions of our own behaviour to others, ie 'I have a really sore throat and I think I must have a cold', we are entering a realm where our description of a current reality is open to validation by another person. The validation of one person's description by another person is a political act. While this may not have serious overtones in the context of a head cold there are powerful implications for those persons who wish to have their experience of pain validated when it is not supported by physiological evidence.
In the context of a therapist-patient relationship the patient offers up symptoms or descriptions which they believe entitles them to the legitimate status 'sick". The therapist or doctor may interpret those same symptoms and descriptions as an example of the patient malingering and therefore making an illegitimate claim to the status 'sick'. In this context of consultation the therapist invalidates the patient, nothing is shared and a common legitimate reality is not negotiated.
What counts as illness
If we take an episode of illness then there are a number of stages in that episode when meanings are offered to others for validation. Making sense of the world is just that, a 'making' of sense. When we make sense it is made in the context of a relationship. Cecil Helman! reminds us that, ' Consultations between doctors and patients do not take place in a vacuum. Rather, they are embedded in a particular time and place, and in a particular physical, social or cultural setting. That is, each consultation is embedded in a particular context. These contexts are important, because they shape what is said in the consultation, how it is said, how it is interpreted, and how it is acted upon'
We can apply the same criteria of time and place to our personal relationships. Helman also goes on to distinguish internal and external contexts.
An internal context is the set of hidden assumptions and responses that each party brings to the relationship. These would include our past experiences of illness, the explanations for the origin of the illness and how symptoms should be treated.
An external context includes the setting in which the event takes place and also includes rules of conduct. In some ways an external context is a form of ritual; it is punctuated as being separate from 'everyday life' and governed by explicit and implicit rules of conduct about how people are to act, speak and dress and what they are to talk about.
At an obvious level we see this in public rituals like weddings and funerals (and conferences), but we also have ritualized ways of dealing with deference, greetings and Ieavings".
At a more fundamental level we have our own internal rituals for recognizing 'stress' or 'no stress' which are based upon a highly compleximmunological language which is more than a biochemical alphabet. This language can be used to identify what is 'self' and 'not self'. In such a way we are daily constituting ourselves. We make a sense of the world bodily. However, as we all are aware, we also make sense of the world psychologically, socially and spiritually.
Sometimes this bodily sense becomes evident in another realm of experience. When we experience pain then a message is being sent from one systemic level (somatic) to another (psychic). This message needs to be interpreted. It is not always immediately discernible what pain is a message about. For instance in the case of back pain is it about muscular distress, or is it a metaphor about distress in a different context, eg having too much to bear or a lack of support? In some recent research into the common cold?the researchers found that people with different representational styles (verbal, visual or enactive) had different ways of being ill. Verbalizers, people who use inner speech, were prone to mouth ulcers. However, visualizers showed no particular propensity for any problems but there was a negative correlation with relaxation and resistance to infection. Somehow literally the way we see the world and represent it to ourselves is a health enhancing activity. Making sense is not only a passive process, but an active process we do to the world.
Rules for the making of sense
A number of authors suggest that 'making sense' is rule-based'P'P. These rules can be separated into two forms'". One, there are rules of constitution.
A constitutive rule would be invoked when we say this behaviour (a sore throat) counts as evidence of another state (having 'caught a cold').
Two, there are rules of regulation. A regulative rule would be invoked when we say if this behaviour (a sore throat) counts as evidence of a particular state (having a 'cold') then do a particular activity (go home to bed).
Constitutive rules then are generally concerned with meaning. Regulative rules are concerned with the politics of relationship and the linking of meaning and action.
This corresponds to the interrelated healing functions of the provision of meaning and the control of sickness which Kleinman" describes. He argues that modem professional health care attends solely to the control of sickness and neglects the understanding of meaning. Furthermore; '... the biomedical education of physicians and other modern health professionals, while providing them with the knowledge to control sickness, systematically blinds them to the second of these core clinical functions (the understanding of meaning), which they learn neither to recognize or to treat'.
In an episode of illness there will be stages when behaviour is understood in terms of constitution, ie meaning, and in tum, regulation, ie control or management. These episodes have critical times when they are seen 'to start' and 'to end'. This is the process of 'punctuation?" and is a selective structuring of reality. Punctuation is vital to interaction as it is a means of organizing behavioural events both in terms of meaning and process.
We see this when someone says 'He always starts an argument', or 'Her problems began when her husband died'. While such punctuations may be shared, they may also be the source of conflict. For instance some of us may recall situations where one person has said 'I was only trying to be helpful and support you', and their partner says 'You were interfering and undermining my ability'. In such an Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 83 November 1990 721 exchange the two punctuations of the same behaviour helpful/interfering are a characterization of the relationship.
In our modern Western culture the predominant focus to punctuate the start of an episode of illness appears to be one of recognizing symptoms which are validated in the context of a relationship whether it be familial, filial, or fraternal. In terms of 'catching a cold' the causative agent is seen as a viral infection and not open to a great deal of debate. However, in considering other forms of illness meanings are not so clear cut.
Symptoms can be employed as a 'language' within a group of people!", and in particular families 18 • 19 where other groups would use less pathological forms of communication. Symptoms become part of a vocabulary of distress. Pain then becomes an indicator not only of physiological distress but also a marker of existential despair, or personal 'hurt' or unwillingness to cooperate.
This medium for communication does not have to be invented, it exists within the subculture of the group or family. We see this when someone has a day off work regularly with a headache. If this should occur repeatedly at times when their work is to be scrutinized by a superior then we might infer as a group that the headache is 'caused' by the imminent scrutiny. In this way we can be said to have shared meanings.
This process is reflected in our therapeutic systems. We learn a set of shared meanings whereby symptoms located in particular contexts are understood in a particular way; ie the process of diagnosis. This would correspond to a set of 'constitutive rules'. Acupuncturists will recognize disturbances in ch'i. Neurolinguistic programmers will recognize maladaptive speech patterns. Structural family therapists will see family coalitions and permeable boundaries. Transactional analysts will hear the child speaking. A priest will recognize the sinner and the sin.
Similarly the process of diagnosis would lead to implications for what to do about those symptoms; ie the process of treatment. This would correspond to a set of 'regulative rules'. The acupuncturist will endeavour to restore balance, the neurolinguist will intervene by talking directly to the somatic system responsible for the problem, the family therapist will ask the family to change seats and move closer together, the transactional analyst will encourage the adult to speak to the adult, while the priest will confer absolution.
The challenge for the therapist or practitioner is that although the symptoms reported by the patient may fit the practitioner's set of rule-based understandings, those rules and corresponding understandings may be quite different to those of the patient and the patient's family. All too often patient and therapist can be at odds because the important phase of negotiating common or shared meanings is missed out.
The implications for therapy are that we must be concerned with understanding what the symptoms constitute for the patient, and what the patient has previously done to regulate those symptoms. In a similar way, we must be aware that by the time a patient reaches the therapist or practitioner they have been through a process where their symptoms have been negotiated and validated in other contexts which may have far more significance for them as persons.
What this paper is proposing is that sometimes, when we see people with persistent problems, it may well be that the personal meaning system of our patients, their sets of constitutive and regulative rules, have been invalidated in other relational contexts, and they too have invalidated the systems of meanings offered by significant others. When such a situation of mutual invalidation occurs, and symptoms appear as 'intractable', then we find that the patient is given a label of deviance or described as resistant rather than the therapist having failed to understand the patient. This too would be falling into a trap of blaming one person in the relationship rather than looking at the therapeutic process itself and the relationship between therapist and patient.
Conclusion
Making and taking health care decisions is a process. We become aware of events which make a difference. Some of these are seen as symptoms and are seen as indicative of certain states. These constitutive rules are learned through experience and are validated in the context of families and friends. We rarely have to invoke these rules as they are habitual. In the context of illness behaviour they form a repertoire for the management of distress. Occasionally when we come into contact with other persons and other groups we find that those rules are questioned and that repertoire is inappropriate.
As these rules are learned in families they persist over time, and can be carried over from one generation to the next. In this way some particular forms of illness behaviour such as depression appear to be hereditary. However, we have not as yet identified the gene responsible for depression, and nor are we likely to. It could well be that depression is not hereditary but it does run in families. At certain times and in particular situations, faced with personal failure in a context of relational conflict, there may be constitutive and regulative rules which propose particular behaviours, eg 'become depressed'. These behaviours are learned in families and transmitted from one generation to the next.
At which level then do we choose to intervene, and at which point in the cycle do we choose to enter? A challenge for us as practitioners and researchers is to elicit those cyclicpatterns of behaviour with their underlying rule structures whereby physiological changes occur in response to personal and relational crises. There may well be rules operating which say that in a particular context (a marital row) a particular action (confronting the other) constitutes a threat and that is regulated by a particular behaviour (elevated heart rate, increase in perspiration, suppression of lymphocytes). While this may well be 'normal' behaviour (and the attribution of normality itself is rule dependent), if there were a set of rules which interpreted all interpersonal situations as threatening (to be regulated by an elevated heart rate or a suppression of lymphocytes) then we might speculate that there is an underlying disease or at least a maladaptive coping strategy20.
In this sort of description then diseases are not fixed or immutable, they are open to change at different levels of intervention, eg a change in a constitutive rule would mean that some events would no longer count as crises, a change in regulative rule would mean a change in response. We do this in treatment where some of us look for underlying attitudes and attempt to change these (the process of constitution), whereas some therapists will attempt to provoke changes in response to stimuli (the process of regulation).
My thesis is that these connections are rule-based. It is important to remember the notion of rule is used here as a metaphor for what happens, not that there is literally a rule book in the head or the family.
These rules need not necessarily be cognitive. They may act solely at the level of physiology where there are physiological changes occurring in response to biochemical markers in the context of immunological stress. As stated earlier what we need to address ourselves to is the continuing problem of how the threat to a threshold at one level, ie the cognitive, brings about a response at another level, ie the physiological. A rules-based explanation addresses this by offering a means of description (but not a causal link) of what happens. By understanding the interaction between these levels we can intervene at differing levels.
From this perspective, the 'personal' view of health is located within the 'familial' which in turn is located within the 'cultural'. We see this reflected in our health care initiatives where health care initiatives are invoked at the personal level of self care and at the level of changing social conditions. What we need to look at is the mediating context of the family for it may be those with whom we live, who significantly influence what sense we make of our lives and what endeavours we pursue to change that sense. It is they with whom we negotiate our health.
Similarly we must continue to be aware that healers and patients are not independent of the cultural context of clinical care, and the explanatory models we bring to bear on illness and healing are resident within this cultural context. In this way we will begin to understand the meaning of illness and the attendant implications for healing rather than the headlong pursuit into the management of disease. This will change our clinical practice and more fundamentally our research endeavours.
However, we must be wary. The way we construct our meanings of problems particularly when presented by the people who come to see us for therapy may be a contribution to the way in which the problem is maintained rather than allowing change to happen. The aphorism 'Psychoanalysis is the illness whose cure it considers itself to be' might well be heeded'" and applied to our own disciplines.
